

BORDER SECURITY IN THE SAHEL
BUILDING A REGIONAL PLATFORM FOR DIALOGUE
AND ACTION

MALI'S BORDER SECURITY
CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES



ASSESSMENT REPORT

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INTRODUCTION

Mali's security officials describe border protection as the country's "Achilles heel."¹ A loosely connected network of agencies and security forces struggle to manage worsening threats along the country's 7,440-kilometer border. Terrorist groups have exploited Mali's porous borders to stage attacks in border areas and in Bamako against state security forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. Furthermore, the sheer geographic extent of Mali's land borders and the fact that only two of these are officially demarcated adds complexity to Mali's border management and operational challenges. Already weakened by a rebellion and subsequent military coup in 2012, Mali's security services face critical capacity gaps that include: (1) insufficient human and materiel resources; (2) poor coordination; (3) inadequate training; and (4) trust deficits between communities and forces posted at the borders.

Border Security in the Sahel: Building a Regional Platform for Dialogue and Action in Mali is a UK DFID-funded project being implemented by a consortium that includes Strategic Capacity Group (SCG), International Alert, and Aktis Strategy. Building on a successful pilot project delivered in Kasserine, Tunisia in 2014-15, this project is designed to help Mali better manage its borders by increasing societal participation in and oversight of border control. In the fall of 2015, SCG conducted an assessment of Mali's border security doctrine and operational capacity. This report draws on the findings from 63 interviews conducted with security force commanders and government officials within the Ministry of Defense and Veterans, the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, the Ministry of Territorial Administration, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the Ministry of Environment and Sanitation. Interviews were also conducted with members of civil society, international observers, and field-deployed security forces in Kayes.

This report offers a gap analysis of Mali's border security capacity and capabilities. It maps existing border security forces, paying particular attention to their institutional structures and operational mandates, and identifies four core deficiencies. A companion report, *A Border Security Skills Development Plan for Mali*, offers recommendations to address some of the gaps highlighted in this report.

MALI'S CONTEMPORARY THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Mali's border security is directly linked to Mali's most pressing security threats—terrorism, banditry, inter-communal violence, drug and arms trafficking, and smuggling. Terrorist groups operate transnationally, and their tactics and techniques are becoming more sophisticated. Terrorism in Mali is no longer just a northern problem, but a national threat. Terrorist attacks in 2015 killed over 100 people in central and southern Mali, a dramatic increase from only one reported death in 2014.² Bamako experienced an unprecedented rise in terrorist incidents with a fivefold increase in 2015.³ Long-standing threats resulting from cattle rustling, banditry, and violence linked to the informal mining sector continue to threaten the lives and livelihoods of populations.⁴ Inter-communal violence, spurred by conflicts over land and cattle, has become more deadly with the influx of weapons. Drug trafficking drives high-level corruption inside the government and security forces, provides income to armed groups operating in Mali and along its borders, and generates armed clashes over the control of trade routes and market share in the northern region.⁵ Borne by returning fighters and smugglers, long guns, RPGs and possibly MANPADs have entered Mali from Libya via southern Algeria and Niger.⁶ Frequent casualties of this illicit trade are innocent civilians and increasingly, Mali's security forces—particularly those stationed along the borders.⁷

Smuggling remains a complex threat. Those smugglers moving the arms that now fuel increasingly bloody battles in Mali are part of a much larger network of *petit commerçants*, whose livelihoods depend on moving contraband such as petrol, cigarettes, food, and gold.⁸ Local communities depend on this commerce and view such smuggling as benign.⁹ Historically, security officials have shared this view. However, smuggling networks are increasingly exploiting, and in turn exacerbating, the porosity of Mali's borders. This vulnerability, alongside growing movement of dangerous contraband such as arms and drugs, is currently shifting the country's security environment. The complexity of this problem and the presence of hybrid threats are ongoing challenges that Mali's security forces are struggling to address.

MALI'S BORDER SECURITY FORCES: STRUCTURE AND MANDATE

No single security service has full operational authority over border security in Mali. Complicating the lack of centralized authority is the fact that each of Mali's security institutions includes border security in its mandate. Relevant institutions are divided into seven distinct security forces reporting to four different ministries. The Ministry of Defense and Veterans has command over the Army, National Guard, and Gendarmerie. The Ministry of Security and Civil Protection controls the National Police and the Central Office Against Drugs (CNO), and has some control over the Gendarmerie and National Guard. The Ministry of Economy and Finance controls Customs. Finally, the Forest Guards report to the Ministry of Environment and Sanitation.

Mali's border security posture can be summarized as follows: in times of peace, security forces with a law enforcement mandate—including gendarmes, police officers, customs agents, National Guardsmen, and Forest Guards—operate closest to the border. The Malian Army typically operates behind this first line, deploying forward in times of acute insecurity or conflict. These forces engage in two sets of activities: control and surveillance.¹⁰ Control involves checks on people, merchandise, and vehicles entering or leaving Mali.¹¹ Police officers, customs agents, and gendarmes are responsible for conducting these checks at fixed posts at or near formal crossing points between Mali and its neighbors. The overwhelming majority of permanent posts are spaced along Mali's southern and southwestern borders. Surveillance takes place between fixed posts and is aimed at identifying and interdicting smugglers and armed groups. National Guardsmen are the main force deployed between fixed posts, although at times the Army, Gendarmerie, Customs, and Forest Guards also assist with surveillance in these areas.

The Army

The dominant security force is the National Army (*Armée de Terre*).¹² Reporting to the Ministry of Defense and Veterans, it numbers roughly 8,000 soldiers.¹³ The Army's mandate is to ensure the country's territorial integrity, both by defending Mali's borders and—in times of crisis—ensuring internal security. The Army is based throughout the country, and, since the 2013 ceasefire, forces have slowly redeployed into the north.¹⁴ As a result of the 2012 coup, and in an effort to adapt to the changing security environment, the Army is currently in a state of reconstruction. Notable among recent initiatives is the creation of eight Combined Arms Tactical Groups (GTIAs) with support from the European Union Training Mission (EUTM).

On the borders, the Army's mandate most closely resembles one of a reserve or rapid reaction force behind the front line and in support of other forces. "If a [security] unit needs help with their mission or are overloaded or in crisis, then the Army is there to assist," noted one military commander.¹⁵ In situations of acute insecurity, escalating violence, or where there is a pattern of attacks on checkpoints, the Army forward deploys to ensure security for frontline units.¹⁶ The Army

also conducts surveillance patrols in border areas. These include joint patrols conducted with the Gendarmerie and National Guard. Joint patrols involving the Army are always under the operational control of the local military commander. Military patrols always incorporate two Gendarmerie officers who have arrest and investigative authority, which the Army otherwise lacks.

The National Gendarmerie

Mali's National Gendarmerie (*Gendarmerie Nationale*) is widely viewed by international observers and Malian citizens as the country's most operationally capable security force. A paramilitary law enforcement force, the Gendarmerie is administratively part of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans, although it falls under the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection for some operational activity.¹⁷ Despite an expansive mandate, the Gendarmerie's total strength stands at 4,200 personnel.¹⁸ Current plans call for the recruitment of an additional 500 gendarmes per year between 2015 and 2020, some of whom will be part of the new *Brigades Frontalières* exclusively dedicated to border security.¹⁹ As of 2015, the Gendarmerie fields only two basic types of units, the *Groupe Territorial* and *Groupe Mobile*.²⁰ Officers assigned to the *Groupe Territorial* are based at fixed posts and also serve as judicial police. Gendarmes attached to the *Groupe Mobile* are tasked with patrol, intervention, and the securing of sensitive sites. In addition to mainline units, the force maintains a number of specialized units, including a rapid intervention unit, an explosive ordnance disposal unit, and canine units.

The Gendarmerie has both a policing and a military mandate. The gendarmes function as a militarized police force, tasked with protecting people and goods in rural areas and along Mali's roads, maintaining public order, investigating criminal activity, and collecting intelligence. In times of war, the force is given two additional functions. First, they are tasked to police the military, ensuring that the military follows applicable laws, including human rights law. They "advise on how to behave on the battlefield, and investigate and prosecute those who violate human rights law."²¹ Second, they can be deployed for combat, operating as a light infantry and intelligence force.

The Gendarmerie maintains 25 fixed posts close to or along Mali's borders. Most of these are located in the south and southwest, though not all posts are believed to be operational.²² Officers at these posts perform control checks on vehicles entering and leaving Mali. The Gendarmerie also conducts some surveillance patrols between posts, although the frequency of such activity is limited due to a lack of resources.

The National Guard

The Malian National Guard (*Garde Nationale*) is the most widely dispersed security force in Mali, especially in rural and remote areas. While administratively part of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans, the Guard's operational role falls in part under the purview of the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection.²³ Most of the 6,000 members of the Guard are assigned to territorial units deployed to fixed posts in *cercles* (districts) throughout Mali.²⁴ Main bases are often located in regional capitals, from which guardsmen rotate to forward security bases for six-month deployments.²⁵ The National Guard also fields several mobile intervention units.

Similar to the Gendarmerie, the National Guard has both civil security and military responsibilities. The primary security mission of the National Guard is to protect public buildings, including key government installations, courts, diplomatic facilities, and banks.²⁶ Additionally, the force is tasked with border security, maintaining law and order, and intelligence collection.²⁷ For the military, the

Guard acts as a rapidly deployable light infantry force. Lacking heavy weaponry, the force is employed to stabilize situations in the field in advance of the Army's arrival.²⁸

Along the border, the Guard does not operate at fixed border posts. Rather, squads are tasked with surveillance and are dispersed in small camps between border posts maintained by other forces.²⁹ Current threat levels have led the Guard to eschew permanent outposts in the north. Rather, mobile containers are employed as temporary forward outposts and are moved frequently. Historically, the National Guard has also focused on long-range patrol activities, especially in the north.

The National Police

The Malian National Police (*Police Nationale*) is responsible for policing towns, cities, and Ports of Entry (POE). Reporting to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, the force has 6,500 officers, although there are plans to hire an additional 2,200. Save for its presence at rural POEs, Mali's National Police is primarily deployed in the nation's urban areas and towns. Outside of cities—including on the borders—officers do not conduct patrols.³⁰ In addition to regular forces, there are specific directorates for counter-narcotics, organized crime, and border control, among others.³¹

The mandate of the National Police is to maintain law and order, protect persons and goods, conduct criminal investigations, civil and national defense, and oversee migration at Mali's borders.³² The National Police issues travel documents to Malian citizens and regulates who enters and leaves the country via official POEs.³³ Migration control checks are conducted at nineteen POEs maintained by the National Police (including at Bamako's international airport and on the rail line coming from Dakar, Senegal).³⁴ The Borders and Air Directorate (*Direction Centrale de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières*) is nominally in charge of border control for the Police, although the Directorate has no command authority over officers at land POEs.

The Central Office Against Drugs

The mission and composition of the CNO, Mali's Central Office Against Drugs (*Office Central des Stupéfiants*), is unique among security agencies in that it draws officers from the National Police, Gendarmerie, and Customs. "Once you're here, you are no longer a gendarme or a policeman. You no longer report to them," stressed the CNO Commander.³⁵ Assignments to the CNO are permanent, not rotational.³⁶ Created in April 2010, it reports directly to the Minister of Security and Civil Protection and is tasked with coordinating the government's efforts to counter illicit drug trafficking.³⁷ The CNO's headquarters and analysis unit are in Bamako. The force maintains units in each of Mali's regions, except for Kidal, where the office is currently shuttered.³⁸

The CNO's activity along Mali's borders is primarily investigative. CNO commanders anticipate expanding their activities following a recent government decree authorizing the development of mobile border units. In addition to conducting operations and developing intelligence, the CNO compiles statistics on narcotics seizures by all of Mali's security agencies.

The Customs Directorate

The Malian Customs Directorate (*Direction Générale des Douanes du Mali*) is active along Mali's borders and at its key POEs. Reporting to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the force is comprised of 2,100 officers.³⁹ A large percentage of the force is based in regional capitals, leaving a limited number of personnel directly along the borders.⁴⁰ In the field, most customs officers are

armed.⁴¹ The Customs Directorate is responsible for countering the importation of banned or controlled products, the smuggling of goods, arms, and drugs, as well as the collection of taxes.⁴²

Border operations of the Customs Directorate include a mixture of checkpoints, patrols, and intelligence-led operations. There are 24 fixed posts established for merchandise checks and tax collection, though it is unclear whether all fixed posts are operational. The vast majority of posts are in the south and southwest. Some surveillance patrolling is also conducted, either by customs officers alone or in conjunction with other security forces. Mobile checkpoints along key roads are also deployed. Finally, a riverine unit exists for checks along the Niger River. As one commander noted, "There is a lot of contraband which comes up the river from Guinea."⁴³

The Forest Guards

The Water and Forests Directorate (*Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forêts*)—known in Mali as the Forest Guards—is one of the country's smallest security forces, although it maintains a fairly widespread presence. Reporting to the Ministry of Environment and Sanitation, the Forest Guard's mission involves security and control of forest areas, the preservation of resources, and advising on the development of natural resources.⁴⁴

While not explicitly charged with border security, Forest Guards are present in many border areas and are involved in surveillance activities. According to one commander, "Forest Guards are the most in the field and on the borders. When *jihadists* and rebels want a safe haven, they go and hide in the forests. We can collect all sorts of information and intelligence and send it to the authorities."⁴⁵ An armed paramilitary force, Forest Guards maintain units throughout the country, and accomplish their mandate both at fixed posts and by patrolling. The Forest Guards are also included in Joint Staff meetings.⁴⁶ Their forward position has at times left them vulnerable. One Forest Guard was killed in Mopti by terrorists in April 2015.⁴⁷ In part to address this danger, a new use of force decree (mandate) was recently issued for the Forest Guards.⁴⁸

MALI'S BORDER SECURITY FORCES: CRITICAL GAPS

Mali's border security features four significant gaps: (1) insufficient human and materiel resources; (2) poor coordination; (3) inadequate training; and (4) trust deficits between communities and forces on the borders.

Insufficient Human and Materiel Resources

One of the most crippling deficits is the lack of human and material resources. Each of the security forces faces constraints in personnel and equipment that hinder its ability to accomplish its mission.⁴⁹ Furthermore, crumbling facilities in remote areas, a lack of mobility, and poor communications impede security force operations and weaken morale.

The first challenge involves personnel. The combined strength of all security and defense forces stands at less than 30,000. National Guard commanders in Bamako noted that in order to fulfill their mandate effectively, the Guard would need to double in size. The National Police face similar constraints. According to Mali's senior Police Commander, the Police have one officer per *eight thousand citizens*—a startling ratio compared to the international standard of one officer per four hundred citizens.⁵⁰

The challenges posed by the small force size are exacerbated by the tendency to centralize forces in Bamako and large regional centers, leaving few forces to man posts and patrol borders.

For example, roughly 40 percent of customs officers are in Bamako, home to only fourteen percent of the nation's population.⁵¹ This concentration limits the number of security personnel active in rural areas, home to 60 percent of the population. A limited police presence means that some POEs are understaffed; others have no staff at all.⁵² Customs officers face similar challenges. At one location in Kayes, a Customs commander noted that he had three officers, rather than the fifteen necessary for the area.⁵³

Despite these challenges, there are some positive efforts to address the severe shortage in personnel. With international assistance, Mali's security services are growing. The army plans to add four new brigades—roughly 2,800 forces—in the coming years, while the Gendarmerie's size will increase by nearly one-third. The National Guard, National Police, and Forest Guards are also recruiting. The desire to increase the size of Mali's security force is understandable, given the existing personnel shortages. However, there is a downside to this rapid growth. First, international observers are concerned that the forces are nearing the limit of their absorptive capacity. Second, there is a sense among experts in Bamako that donor efforts to build up Mali's security forces are birthing a force that is not financially sustainable in the medium and long term.⁵⁴

In addition to the challenges of force size, problems with the recruitment process also shape the personnel environment.⁵⁵ These include corruption and the bypassing of hiring standards. For example, each of the security forces specifies a set of physical and educational criteria for new hires. Yet, as noted in interviews, educational requirements, the absence of a police record, and the need to meet certain physical qualifications are “never respected.”⁵⁶ Additionally, prospective police recruits are sometimes expected to pay for entrance into the services.⁵⁷ At the higher levels, a “pay to post” system reportedly exists, with some senior officers going so far as to fund political parties. “The one who has contributed the most gets the post they want,” explained one Malian journalist.⁵⁸ When recruitment efforts take place in more remote areas, busloads of young men from more affluent areas like Bamako arrive in advance to “buy” local papers to gain entry.⁵⁹ In the army, the ability of some to “buy” entry into the force has generated a high concentration of southerners within the military.⁶⁰ This creates patronage networks that are deeply ingrained in the institutions and remarkably difficult to penetrate. Corruption within the recruitment process also creates a perverse incentive for militancy on the part of some excluded groups. One case of a Tuareg fighter is illustrative. He joined the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg insurgent group, to profit from the anticipated peace treaty—specifically the clauses integrating former fighters into the security forces.⁶¹ For many minorities in the north, joining armed groups is the most feasible way to gain entry into Mali's security forces.

A further personnel challenge is tied to low levels of pay, although this varies from force to force. Low salaries have depleted morale and, according to several security commanders, increased the susceptibility of officers to bribery and corruption. “There is a trade-off going on here,” noted the economic crimes prosecutor in Bamako. “We're not going to pay our officers that well, but we will close our eyes to the corruption business. We need to start paying those officers decent wages.”⁶² Interviews in Kayes indicated that local citizens feel that the Malian Police and Gendarmerie in their villages are there to make money and not to protect the population or their property.⁶³ Poor pay has also skewed operational considerations. Efforts to maximize opportunities for illicit extraction have generated an intense territoriality among security forces, each anxious to protect its access to revenue streams. According to one international observer, “Units which don't necessarily have interaction with the public try to change that so they can profit.”⁶⁴ Low levels of pay have led to profiteering, particularly through the sale of identity documents. Reportedly rampant in rural areas, the market for documents is readily supported by criminals and terrorists and intensifies citizen frustration with the security forces. “Such was the case of Blé Goudé,” noted one Malian journalist. “He was wanted in Côte d'Ivoire but was able to get a Malian identity card, issued by the Malian National Police.”⁶⁵

In terms of human and materiel resource challenges, poor facilities represent the second major area of concern. Personnel stationed along the border face “very difficult” working conditions. Many border posts, and security service facilities more widely, are in poor physical shape.⁶⁶ One customs officer described the working conditions on the border, explaining that “the walls of our lodging are cracked, and during the rainy season we fear our offices can collapse any time.”⁶⁷ Officers in several areas of the Kayes region noted that their facilities lack electricity and running water.⁶⁸ A Gendarmerie officer in Kayes added that he must tap into a neighboring house to access utilities at his post.⁶⁹ The lack of electricity prevents the use of computers and other technology on the job, including technical equipment for border checks.⁷⁰ Although technical equipment is available in some locations, there are persistent problems with breakdowns, while limited spare parts and expertise prevent repair of broken equipment. Poor working conditions in the field and frustrations over the lack of working equipment have negatively impacted officer morale and constrained operational effectiveness. Efforts—including those funded by donors—are ongoing to refurbish the forward posts, but the results of such efforts are unlikely to be immediate given the sheer number and remoteness of the facilities needing attention.

The third major challenge is the lack of equipment, including weaponry, vehicles and petrol, and communications. Interviews in Kayes with commanders from different security forces indicated that an insufficient supply of weapons and ammunition seriously impact operations along the border.⁷¹ “We cannot face a terrorist attack,” a National Guard officer explained, “because we do not have the proper equipment to stop such an attack.”⁷² In addition to raising force protection concerns, a lack of adequate weaponry also leads some security forces to limit their operations for fear of reprisals. “I’ve talked to security officers in the field,” one international observer noted. These officers “know where the traffickers are, but if they go out to confront them, [they fear it] would stir up a hornet’s nest.”⁷³

The equipment gap is particularly acute in terms of mobility. There is a significant lack of vehicles, spare parts, petrol, and lift. In 2014, the CNO had no functioning vehicles in Kayes, Gao, or Timbuktu.⁷⁴ One National Guard officer even admitted to paying for petrol with his own money—a common practice it turns out—in order to conduct needed patrols along the border.⁷⁵ In other cases, villagers have reportedly resorted to renting out cars and providing gasoline to ensure that security forces could patrol and respond to local incidents.⁷⁶ The lack of mobility is particularly problematic given Mali’s vast territory and limited number of forces. Small units are often responsible for relatively large geographic areas. Without adequate mobility, these units cannot conduct regular patrols and surveillance along the border.⁷⁷ Airlift capacity is also seriously compromised. For example, during the attack in Sévaré, the President reportedly had to request assistance from United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to transport a Gendarmerie special tactics squad to the scene because Mali lacked sufficient lift.⁷⁸

Communications equipment is also in short supply. Mali’s senior Police Commander described this serious gap as a “national problem,” noting that security forces lack the equipment to respond to emergencies.⁷⁹ Security officers recognize that the lack of official communication equipment “endangers security officers.”⁸⁰ In the field, these gaps have prompted problematic workarounds. “We have to use our own mobile phones with our own credit.”⁸¹ One National Guard officer explained that in order to coordinate his missions, he purchased airtime with his personal funds.⁸² While the lack of communications equipment is overwhelmingly negative, there is a small silver lining. The reliance on mobile phones ensures interoperable communications between different security forces, easing coordination in case of an emergency.

Poor Coordination

Coordination among Mali's security forces is weak both at the ministerial level and in the field. When coordination occurs, it is often based on necessity—an attempt to overcome materiel gaps—or on personal relationships among force commanders. Commanders in a number of services recognize lack of coordination as a weakness and express interest in improving it. However, due to limited resources and personnel and poor institutional relations, the reality is that “each [security force] wants to lead the coordination and each wants to protect its turf.”⁸³

In Bamako, it is unclear how and to what degree security ministries coordinate activities and share information. There is no ministerial coordination unit on security issues.⁸⁴ Likewise, there is no central point or office where information collected by the various services is collated and exploited. The result, according to one international observer, is “untouched information.”⁸⁵ The coordination issue has been raised in Mali's security sector reform (SSR) process but is unlikely to be easily resolved. As explained by the National Council on SSR Coordinator, “each Ministry is very jealous of its territory, which impairs the coordination process from moving forward quickly.”⁸⁶

At the regional level, coordination is nominally the governor's responsibility. Despite reporting to the Ministry of Territorial Administration, governors are the ultimate security commanders of their regions, “even if they are civilians.”⁸⁷ A security committee (*Commission de Sécurité*), comprised of the regional commanders of all security forces active in a given region, advise the governor on security issues.⁸⁸ At a minimum, it includes the Police, National Guard, Gendarmerie, and Army.⁸⁹ In some cases, non-security personnel, including local politicians, are also involved.⁹⁰ Commissions meet weekly and focus on the operational challenges in that region.⁹¹ Once a decision is made at the committee level, each of the component organizations is tasked with implementation.⁹²

Below the regional level, coordination follows a similar process in each *cercle*. All security forces active in a *cercle* report to the civilian *préfet*. Information sharing and coordination is achieved through regular meetings of a *cercle*-level security committee. *Préfets* have the authority to task security agencies with specific missions during these meetings.⁹³

Operationally, coordination and information sharing among security forces is infrequent and, when it occurs, typically based on *ad hoc* relationships and personal communications rather than institutional mechanisms.⁹⁴ One reason for the lack of coordination, according to Mali's Senior Police Commander, “is that officers want as many bribes as they can get; coordination affects this.”⁹⁵ Also absent is a common means for sharing information as well as mechanisms to send intelligence back to a regional headquarters.⁹⁶

Border control activities are nearly always siloed. Most security posts are single service, and co-location is rare.⁹⁷ The lack of co-location leads to duplication in facilities and costs, decreases information sharing, and causes frustration for cross-border traders and merchants.⁹⁸ Malian security officials and international donors are pushing to integrate border security personnel at single posts.⁹⁹ Yet because of inter-service rivalry, one international observer noted that co-location is “really a non-starter.”¹⁰⁰

Information flow can even be problematic within individual security services. For example, police at Mali's land borders are line officers controlled by regional police commanders, while responsibility for analysis rests with the Borders and Air Directorate. Any information collected about individuals entering or leaving Mali—typically handwritten—is first given to the regional headquarters, and then forwarded to the Borders and Air Directorate. According to officers in the Directorate, this system significantly slows the flow of information and the ability to analyze it.¹⁰¹ Dissemination of information is also impeded. Within the National Police, access to Interpol

databases is tightly controlled and not available at POEs, limiting officers' access to information about border crossers.¹⁰²

Surveillance activities are often single-service, although joint patrols between security forces do occur with some regularity in rural areas. One officer in Kayes noted that they take place quarterly.¹⁰³ Regional commanders typically have a large role in determining the frequency and composition of joint patrolling.¹⁰⁴ Typically, centrally organized joint patrols are conducted under the auspices of the Army and involve security forces drawn from the Gendarmerie, National Guard, and Customs.¹⁰⁵ Joint patrolling is also driven by resource gaps. "The different law enforcement agencies and security forces do not have sufficient means to conduct patrols," said one commander in Kayes. "That's why all agencies join their human and materiel means to patrol together."¹⁰⁶ Security officials in Kayes credited the improving security situation in the region to a recent increase in the number of joint patrols.¹⁰⁷

The lack of institutionalized and systematized coordination among the numerous security forces and agencies is a key weakness in Mali's border security operations. The gaps in information sharing are equally critical, and—given Mali's reliance on intelligence for operations—extremely problematic in an era of increasing security threats. Malian and international observers have suggested the creation of a coordination cell on border security issues, as well as the creation of a National Security Adviser position. Such a cell or position would be vested with the ability to pull together information from the various security ministries to ensure coordination.¹⁰⁸ The CNO is a useful model for creating an interagency unit or position to manage Mali's border security challenges. Doing so will require overcoming institutional rivalries at senior levels and throughout the ranks.¹⁰⁹

Inadequate Training

Gaps in the training of Mali's security forces directly impact effectiveness, limit coordination among the different services, and leave forces ill-prepared to counter emerging security threats. The sharp increase in recruitment since 2012 has exacerbated these challenges. Senior officers and personnel in the field recognize the need for new training—for recruits as well as mid-career personnel—that is tailored to the changed operational environment and provides them with the skills necessary to do their jobs.

Under the current system, Mali's security forces receive initial training in a broadly similar manner. Enlisted recruits from most of the security services undergo six months of basic military training, often administered by the Army. There is some variation. Police undergo only three months of basic military training, while gendarmes receive six or eight months.¹¹⁰ Prior to the 1990s, basic training was conducted jointly. After 1992, the program was ended, according to one official, because "the politicians didn't want the security forces to know each other."¹¹¹ Since the cessation of joint basic training in the 1990s, the security forces developed siloed training programs for enlisted personnel. Officers from the Army, Gendarmerie, and National Guard attend a joint officer training school in Koulikoro. They train there for three years then elect which security force and branch to enter upon graduation.¹¹²

After completing basic military training, enlisted recruits and officers undergo additional advanced training at their individual service academies. The duration of this training varies. Gendarmes undergo a 12-month academy course, police officers have a nine to twelve-month course, and guardsmen complete a six-month course.¹¹³ The academies offer trainings tailored to each of their service missions. After graduation, several forces engage in a defined period of "on-the-job" training. These include the National Police and National Guard, though others may also be involved.¹¹⁴ This probationary period typically lasts a year.¹¹⁵ Some mid-career training is

offered, including specialized courses in border security. The Gendarmerie mandates that officers undertake a certain amount of yearly training and explicitly links promotion to skills development. It is unclear whether other security forces maintain similar incentivized promotion systems.

Mali's security forces recognize that current training efforts are inadequate. First, the training has not caught up with the current operational environment.¹¹⁶ "We were created as a conventional force," stressed a senior military officer. "We haven't adapted yet to guerilla warfare. We must change our mindsets, our training, and our approach to address the new challenges."¹¹⁷ New units and new training initiatives are being developed, but it is unclear whether these trainings are being institutionalized across Mali's training academies. Assisted by EUTM, the Army's current development of Combined Arms Tactical Groups (GTIAs) is intended to transform the force into one which has the mobility and self-sufficiency necessary to address Mali's new security threats. The Gendarmerie are also attempting to adapt their force with new specialized training and equipment. The planned Brigades Frontalières will be specially trained and equipped for a border security mission. A specialized river unit is also planned. It is unclear to what degree the training for these new units—including those supplied by EUTM, EUCAP Sahel Mali, and the United Nations—are being institutionalized and disseminated throughout Mali's security service academies. Without such institutionalization, the risk is that these efforts will produce centers of excellence that do not benefit or inform the broader force.

Second, the current siloed training does not favor cross-service cooperation or "jointness" among the forces. The end of joint training in 1992 removed a key opportunity for trust-building. According to an army officer, when joint training ended, "we noticed that many conflicts emerged between forces."¹¹⁸ In order to buttress trust, limit inter-service conflicts, and enhance the ability to operate jointly, joint basic training should be re-institutionalized. Security officials recognize the benefits of joint training. "We believe that when you go to school together you get to know each other," explained one army officer. "When you train together, you meet, you go through the same suffering, and you develop great respect for each other."¹¹⁹

Third, in-career training is not standardized. Courses are instructor designed and driven, rather than centrally developed to respond to key force concerns. The lack of standardized training produces uneven quality of content and methods of instruction. It also adds to instructor workload, particularly if each course has to be recreated when instructors rotate in and out of the academy.¹²⁰ Furthermore, it is unclear whether specialists on border security are involved in the development of border security training. For example, the Borders and Air Directorate indicated that they have no input into the development of border security training, despite being frequently dispatched to international conferences to learn "best practices."¹²¹ There does not seem to be one center of excellence within the government of Mali for capturing, analyzing, and disseminating best practices for training on border security.

Fourth, trained personnel are not properly utilized, and their field experience and knowledge is neither properly captured nor disseminated when forces rotate to new positions. Police officials emphasized this problem, noting that regular line officers, rather than specially trained Borders and Air personnel, are assigned to staff POEs. These line officers frequently lack sufficient training on border security techniques and procedures. Further complicating operational effectiveness and information sharing, these line officers report to their regional police commanders, not to the Borders and Air Directorate. In Kayes Region, police commanders requested additional training both on border control techniques and on basic procedural issues.¹²² Across Mali's security services, increased access to tailored border security courses would benefit the officers as well as operational effectiveness on the borders. Training gaps are further impacted by the rapid rotation of personnel common throughout Mali's security forces. For example, in the Army's recently created Waraba Battalion, one of the new GTIA units, nearly fifty percent of the battalion's forces

were rotated out in the first two years of operations.¹²³ Police officials along the border are reportedly rotated frequently, limiting their ability to develop local knowledge or to gain significant experience on border security operations. As one police union official noted, “Officers are trained in border control techniques, assigned to a post, and then quickly transferred to another assignment.”¹²⁴

Finally, and despite training on rules of engagement and human rights policies, concerns exist that field-based personnel from all of Mali's security agencies do not “really know and practice these policies.”¹²⁵ Although mid-career and supplementary trainings are offered, it is unclear whether basic refresher courses are offered to enlisted personnel or to forces based in rural and remote areas.

Mali's senior commanders recognize these gaps and are trying to find ways to address them. As a senior Customs commander stressed, “Not all of our staff are properly trained. A key goal for us is to rectify that.”¹²⁶ However, doing so will require institutionalizing and standardizing new training, developing specialized border security training, and utilizing joint training to build trust and cross-service cooperation.

Community Security Engagement

Improving the operational effectiveness of Mali's border security forces cannot be achieved solely by addressing critical gaps in resources, coordination, and training. Effectiveness can also be measurably enhanced through effective and sustained engagement between security forces and communities in Mali's border regions.

Mali's security force commanders recognize that engaging effectively with the population is vital for border security. The National Police have launched an information campaign stressing “You are first to suffer from [porous borders]. It is important to pass information. It is important that we act as one.”¹²⁷ Some forces, such as the Gendarmerie, have routine reporting requirements on community engagement. However, community engagement, as it is currently practiced is, with few exceptions, an information collection and intelligence generating activity. This is not surprising given the serious resource and technical constraints under which Mali's security forces operate on the border.

Critical resource gaps have led security forces from all branches to develop strategies for doing more with less. According to one Gendarmerie commander, “When it comes to border communities, when a brigade commander is assigned to the border, he is tasked to go and meet with the chiefs, elders, and traditional leaders in the communities to collect information and build good relations.”¹²⁸ Gendarmerie officials see efforts to engage the population as successful, although most note that there is room for improvement. However, the Gendarmerie's role as an intelligence force has stymied some outreach efforts, reflected in a Malian saying “do not trust a Gendarme, even if he is your brother.”

Poor perceptions of Mali's security forces by the communities in which they operate present an enormous hurdle to building better community-security engagement. Perceptions differ by force, with the Army and the Gendarmerie rated most highly, while Police and Customs officers struggle with a poor image. The percentage of Malians who trust the Police has fall sharply, from 73 percent in 2005 to only 49 percent in 2013.¹²⁹ Widespread frustration with police corruption, poor training, inexperience, and a reputation for excessive force contribute to the trust deficit. Similar concerns exist regarding the other security forces. The roots of these poor perceptions are in part historic. “After the transition to democracy, the security forces lost a lot of authority. In the eyes of the population, the relationship had never been about respect, but instead about fear. Once the fear

was lost, the security forces were in a quandary."¹³⁰ Many Malians continue to view the security forces with varying degrees of distrust.

Popular frustration with the security forces is often highly localized and shaped by poor service delivery and a lack of professionalization. According to a Member of Parliament (MP) from Kayes Region, "The population doesn't reject security force officers flat out, only if they aren't doing their job or not protecting the population."¹³¹ Although local commanders are aware of these poor perceptions, they are also limited in how they can respond. Without enough vehicles—or petrol—for officers to report to the scene of a crime or respond to a distress call, security forces appear ineffectual and the perception that they do not care is perpetuated.

As a tool for effective border management, community engagement rests on the idea that security is the shared responsibility of both forces and populations. Security forces have a responsibility to protect the population from cross-border threats and incursions that impact the lives and livelihoods of local communities. At the same time, local populations have a responsibility to report crime and share information about nefarious cross-border activities with local security forces. Generating this sense of shared responsibility requires regular engagement, not only in times of crisis, but also in day-to-day interactions. Over time, such engagement can build trust and familiarity. Where perceptions of the security forces are poor, security force responsiveness to citizen needs can improve perceptions and further build trust, increasing the likelihood that local communities will be willing to engage with the security forces and provide them vital information. In so doing, security forces can see their operational effectiveness enhanced.

Even in Mali's resource-constrained environment, there are ways to engage with communities effectively to build trust—and enhance the effectiveness of the border security forces. One way to do this is, in the words of the coordinator of Mali's National Council on SSR, is "to redefine who is involved in 'security', moving away from a focus only on security forces" and "bringing citizens in" as security partners.¹³² The MP from Kayes suggested that relationship building can be generated through community outreach aimed at educating local populations about the law and their responsibilities as Malian citizens. "Many in the villages are not educated and don't understand the law or the role of the Police. Police officers who are well-liked are often those who explain the infraction a villager has committed to him, educating the villager on the law. However, most of the time the security forces don't see their role as educators."¹³³

Community members are not the only ones in need of education. Security officers do not widely recognize that community engagement is about more than generating intelligence. Better community-security relations can also enhance security responsiveness, generate trust within communities, and enhance operational effectiveness. "Security can't be improved if you can't bring communities to identify their own threats," a senior military commander explained. "We have lost the capacity to listen to communities, to hear needs." One way to correct this is to create "spaces for listening, and for shared resources."¹³⁴ Establishing community-security forums in key border communities can generate regular and sustained interaction between communities and security forces. Another way is to introduce community-sensitive border management training for security forces and their commanders, providing them with skills and tools to address lingering trust deficits and improve communication and engagement.

CONCLUSION

This report identifies four critical gaps associated with Mali's border security capacity and capabilities. These are (1) insufficient human and materiel resources; (2) poor coordination; (3) inadequate training; and (4) trust deficits between communities and forces on the borders.

Insufficient human and material resources involve three key gaps: personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. Personnel gaps—including the size of the force, recruitment challenges, and pay and corruption problems—stymie efforts to project effective security force presence throughout Mali's border areas. Equipment gaps—in weapons, mobility, and communications—impede force protection and impact operational effectiveness. Infrastructure gaps degrade morale and obstruct efforts to deploy new technology to remote border posts. The coordination of Mali's border security forces is minimal, held back by a lack of trust and institutional rivalries among the forces. When coordination occurs, it is often the result of *ad hoc* relationships and material need rather than institutionalized processes. Efforts to achieve coordination between forces are impeded by siloed training. There are also questions about whether current border security instruction is sufficient, regularly available, and responsive to the key challenges faced by the forces. Once trained, personnel are not always properly utilized nor is knowledge refreshed. However, while many of these challenges are severe, Mali's security commanders are aware of them and are working to find solutions. Trust deficits between the forces and communities are shaped by poor public opinion of the forces and frustration over service delivery.

One key area of opportunity for addressing these challenges is Mali's human capital. A companion report, *A Border Security Skills Development Plan for Mali*, offers a series of recommendations to build the capacity of Mali's forces and institutions. Introducing a set of tailored skills-building and training interventions, this companion report provides guidance for Mali's government to empower the country's human capital to address evolving challenges and threats.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Interview with senior official, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, Bamako, September 2015.
- 2 Terrorist-linked violence in northern Mali declined slightly in 2015. This was offset, however, by a sharp spike in terrorist-linked killings in central and southern Mali. Thirty-five terrorist-linked deaths were recorded in Mopti, twenty-nine in Bamako, seventeen in Segou, twelve in Koulikoro, and seven in Sikasso. No terrorist-linked deaths were recorded in Kayes. Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen, "Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 47:5 (2015): 651-660.
- 3 Ibid. See also United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, S/2015/219* (March 27, 2015), 8.
- 4 Interviews with civil society representatives, Kayes, October 2015; interviews with retired Gendarmerie commanders, Bamako, October 2015. See also: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Organized Crime in the West Africa Region* (Vienna: 2009), 31.
- 5 Interviews, retired Gendarmerie commanders, Bamako, October 2015; United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, S/2015/219* (March 27, 2015), 5. See also: International Crisis Group, *Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform*, Africa Report No. 201, (Brussels: 2013), 25; United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment* (Vienna: 2013), 13; West Africa Commission on Drugs, *Not Just in Transit: Drugs, the State and Society in West Africa* (June 2014), 26.
- 6 Querine Hanlon and Matthew Herbert, *Border Security in the Grand Maghreb* (Washington, DC: USIP Peaceworks, 2015), 19; United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2013, 36-37.
- 7 "Smugglers have started carrying arms, and we now see attacks on our officers." Interview with the Conseiller Technique, Ministry of Economic Development, Bamako, September 2015.
- 8 Often goods are sold locally within the border area. But these networks operate across Mali and goods are also moved across the country. Twenty percent of goods smuggled in from Algeria are destined for markets in Bamako. Sami Bensassi, Anne Brockmeyer, Mathieu Pellerin, and Gaël Raballand, *Algeria-Mali Trade: The Normality of Informality* (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 2015), 17; interviews with retired Gendarmerie commanders, Bamako, October 2015.
- 9 Interview with a Member of Parliament from Kayes Region, Bamako, September 2015.
- 10 EUCAP Sahel Mali, *Contrôle Des Frontières Et Migration Irregulière Au Mali - Analyse Contextuelle Par EUCAP Sahel Mali* (Bamako: EUCAP Sahel Mali, October 28, 2015), 20.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 The mandate of the Air Force (l'Armée de l'Air) is to support Army operations. It comprises only 300 personnel, mostly located at the Bamako Airport and with limited capabilities for lift and surveillance.
- 13 Correspondence with journalist, *L'Essor*, December 2015; Interview with freelance journalist, October 2015.
- 14 Interview with the Chef d'Etat Major Adjoint of the Army, and Commander of the Operations Division of the Army, Bamako, October 2015.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 EUCAP Sahel Mali, 18.
- 18 Interview with a EUCAP Sahel Mali official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Interview with officers of the Operations Division, Gendarmerie, Bamako, September 2015.
- 21 Interview with the Commander of the Operations Division, Gendarmerie, Bamako, October 2015.
- 22 Interview with a EUCAP Sahel Mali official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 23 Interview with the Chef d'Etat Major of the National Guard, Bamako, September 2015; EUCAP Sahel Mali, 2015, 18.
- 24 Interview with the Chef d'Etat Major of the National Guard, Bamako, September 2015.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid; interview with a EUCAP Sahel Mali official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 27 Interview with the Chef d'Etat Major of the National Guard, Bamako, September 2015; Mahamadou Nimaga, "Mali," in Alan Bryden and Boubacar N'Diaye, eds., *Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities*, (Geneva: Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2008), 131.
- 28 Interview with the Chef d'Etat Major of the National Guard, Bamako, September 2015.
- 29 Ibid.; EUCAP Sahel Mali, 19; Kalilou Sidibé, "Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms," *IDS Research Report 77* (August 2012), 77.
- 30 Interview with a senior official, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, Bamako, September 2015; interview with the Director of Police, Bamako, September 2015.
- 31 Interview with the Director of Police, Bamako, September 2015; U.S. Department of State, *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Country Report: Mali*, Available at <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/222924.htm>, Accessed December 13, 2015.
- 32 Interview with the Director of Police, Bamako, September 2015; Mahamadou Nimaga, 129.
- 33 Interview with the Commander, Direction Centrale de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières, Bamako, October 2015.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Interview with the Director, Central Office Against Drugs, Bamako, September 2015.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Ibid. See also U.S. Department of State, *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*.

- 39 Interview with the Conseiller Technique, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Bamako, September 2015.
- 40 Interview with a EUCAP Sahel Mali official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 41 Interview with the Director General of Customs, Bamako, September 2015.
- 42 Interview with the Conseiller Technique, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Bamako, September 2015; interview with the Secretary General of the National Union of Malian Workers (UNTM), Bamako, October 2015.
- 43 Interview with the Director General of Customs, Bamako, September 2015.
- 44 Interview with the Director of Forest Guards, Water and Forests Directorate, Bamako, September 2015.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 RFI, *Mali: qui est derrière les attaques dans le centre du pays?* Posted April 12, 2015, Accessible at: <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20150412-deux-soldats-maliens-tues-une-attaque-le-centre-pays>, Accessed December 13, 2015.
- 48 Interview with a United Nations official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 49 Interviews with retired Gendarmerie commanders, Bamako, October 2015.
- 50 Interview with the Director of Police, Bamako, September 2015.
- 51 Interview with the Conseiller Technique, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Bamako, September 2015.
- 52 Interview with the Commander, Borders and Air Directorate, Bamako, October 2015.
- 53 Interview with a customs officer, Yelimané Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 54 Interview with a journalist, *Le Republican*, Bamako, October 2015
- 55 Most of Mali's security services recruit from among the civilian population. This includes the National Guard, whose previous policy of recruiting from the ranks of former military personnel has changed. The only forces to have a slightly different recruitment pattern are the CNO—which draws from and trains security officers from other agencies—and the Forest Guards, which draws from both the civil service and the civilian population.
- 56 Interview with a police commander, Bamako, October 2015.
- 57 Interview with a journalist, *L'Essor*, Bamako, October 2015.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Interview with a freelance journalist, October 2015.
- 60 The high concentration of southerners in the military has been a longstanding problem in Mali. Reportedly, the National Guard and Gendarmerie have a slightly better representation of northern ethnic groups. See Festus Kofi Aubyn, *Policing and Peace Operations in Africa: Reflections on MINUSMA*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 39 (March 2015), 15.
- 61 Ibid.
- 62 Interview with the Economic Crimes Prosecutor, Bamako, October 2015.
- 63 Interviews with citizens and civil society representatives in Kayes, October 2015.
- 64 Interview with a United Nations official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 65 Correspondence with a journalist, *L'Essor*, November 2015.
- 66 Interview with an official from the International Organization for Migration, Bamako, October 2015.
- 67 Interview with a Customs commander, Kayes Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 68 In one cercle in Kayes Region, a Gendarmerie officer noted that in order to access utilities for his base, he "had to connect to the water and electricity network in neighboring houses."
- 69 Interview with a Gendarmerie commander, Nioro Du Sahel Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 70 Interview with a Gendarmerie officer, Yelimané Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 71 Interview with a Police commander, Kayes Cercle, Kayes, October 2015; interview with a Police commander, Nioro Du Sahel Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 72 Interview with a National Guard commander, Nioro du Sahel Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 73 Interview with a United Nations official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 74 U.S. Department of State, *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Country Report*.
- 75 Interview with a National Guard officer, Nioro Du Sahel Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 76 Interview with the Mayor of Nioro, Kayes, October 2015.
- 77 Interview with a EUCAP Sahel Mali official, Bamako, October 2015; interview with a Customs commander, Kayes Cercle, Kayes, October 2015; interview with the Conseiller Technique, Ministry of Territorial Administration, Bamako, September 2015.
- 78 Interview with a journalist, *L'Essor*, September 2015.
- 79 Interview with the Director of Police, Bamako, September 2015.
- 80 Interview with a Gendarmerie commander, Kayes Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 81 Interview with a National Guard commander, Nioro Du Sahel Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 82 Ibid.
- 83 Interview with the Director General of Customs, Bamako, September 2015.
- 84 Interview with the Commander of the Operations Division, Gendarmerie, Bamako, October 2015.
- 85 Interview with a EUCAP Sahel Mali official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 86 Interview with the Coordinator, Conseil National pour la Réforme du Système de Sécurité, Bamako, September 2015.
- 87 Interview with a retired Gendarmerie commander, Bamako, September 2015.
- 88 Interview with the Conseiller Technique, Ministry of Economic Development, Bamako, September 2015.
- 89 Interview with a retired Gendarmerie commander, Bamako, September 2015.
- 90 Interview with the former Governor of Kayes Region and Gao regions, Bamako, October 2015.
- 91 Interview with the Conseiller Technique, Ministry of Economic Development, September 2015.
- 92 Ibid; interview with a retired Gendarmerie commander, Bamako, September 2015.
- 93 Interview with the Conseiller Technique, Ministry of Territorial Administration, Bamako, September 2015.

- 94 Interview with a EUCAP Sahel Mali official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 95 Interview with the Director of Police, Bamako, September 2015.
- 96 Interview with a EUCAP Sahel Mali official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 97 According to a senior official at the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, "Right now, when you come to the border you find a number of posts—Gendarmerie, Police, Customs—that are separate." Interview with a senior official, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, Bamako, September 2015.
- 98 Interview with an official from the Malian Chamber of Commerce, Bamako, October 2015.
- 99 Interview with a senior official, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, Bamako, September 2015.
- 100 Interview with United Nations officials, Bamako, September 2015.
- 101 Interview with the Commander, Direction Centrale de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières, Bamako, October 2015.
- 102 U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013: Mali*, Accessible at: <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm>, accessed December 13, 2015.
- 103 Interview with an officer of the Gendarmerie, Yelimané Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 104 Interview with Operations Division officers, Gendarmerie, Bamako, September 2015.
- 105 Interview with the Etat-Major General des Armées, Bamako, September 2015.
- 106 Interview with a commander of the National Guard, Kayes, October 2015.
- 107 Ibid; interview with a Customs officer, Kayes Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 108 Interview with a United Nations official, Bamako, October 2015; interview with a journalist, *Le Republican*, Bamako, October 2015.
- 109 Interview with the Director of Police, Bamako, October, 2015.
- 110 Interview with Operations Division officers, Gendarmerie, Bamako, September 2015.
- 111 Interview with a senior official, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, Bamako, September 2015.
- 112 Interview with the Chef d'Etat Major Adjoint of the Army, Bamako, October 2015.
- 113 Interview with the Director of Police, Bamako, September 2015; interview with the Chef d'Etat Major of the National Guard, Bamako, September 2015.
- 114 Interview with the Director of Police, Bamako, September 2015; interview the Chef d'Etat Major of the National Guard, Bamako, September 2015.
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- 116 Interview with the Conseiller Technique, Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, Bamako, September 2015.
- 117 Interview with the Etat-Major General des Armées, Bamako, September 2015.
- 118 Interview with the Chef d'Etat Major Adjoint of the Army, and Commander of the Army Operations Division, Bamako, September 2015.
- 119 Ibid.
- 120 Interview with police officials responsible for training, Bamako, October 2015.
- 121 Interview with the Commander, Direction Centrale de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières, Bamako, October 2015.
- 122 Interview with a police commander, Kayes Cercle, Kayes, October 2015; interview with a police commander, Nioro Du Sahel Cercle, Kayes, October 2015.
- 123 Guillaume Belan, "EUTM prepares for second mandate," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 51:19 (April 2, 2014).
- 124 Interview with Police Union representatives, Bamako, October 2015.
- 125 Interview with a United Nations official, Bamako, October 2015.
- 126 Interview with the Director General of Customs, Bamako, September 2015.
- 127 Interview with the Commander, Direction Centrale de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières, Bamako, October 2015.
- 128 Interview with officers of the Gendarmerie Operations Division, Bamako, September 2015.
- 129 Pauline M. Wambua, "Police Corruption in Africa Undermines Trust, But Support for Law Enforcement Remains Strong," *Afrobarometer*, Dispatch No. 56 (November 2, 2015), 8.
- 130 Interview with a freelance journalist, October 2015.
- 131 Interview with a Member of Parliament from Kayes Region, Bamako, September 2015.
- 132 Interview with the Coordinator, Conseil National pour la Réforme du Système de Sécurité, Bamako, September 2015.
- 133 Interview with a Member of Parliament from Kayes Region, Bamako, September 2015.
- 134 Interview with the Etat-Major General des Armées, Bamako, September 2015.



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